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Bangladesh’s parliamentary elections, held on 30 December 2018, saw Sheikh Hasi-
na’s landslide victory. Hasina’s fourth term and third consecutive mandate was a 
sign of undisputable continuity.
Throughout the year the government continued an intensive anticorruption cam-
paign, started when the Awami League came back to power in 2009. As a result, at 
the beginning of 2018 the Bangladesh National Party’s leader and former Prime 
Minister Khaleda Zia along with a number of party members were jailed. 
The main opposition party was facing an unprecedented crisis, which did not neces-
sarily depend on the government’s anticorruption activity.
The economy continued to perform well and foreign policy took a more articulated 
shape, beyond a not always easy balance between India and China. 
The Rohingya emergency alleviated, as the refugees’ influx to Bangladesh signifi-
cantly reduced, but hundreds of thousands of refugees were still living in camps and 
their future looked uncertain. 
1. Introduction 
At Bangladesh parliamentary elections held on 30 December 2018 
Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League won a landslide victory. On the one hand, 
the arrest of the incumbent prime minister’s rival, Khaleda Zia, and of 
several other Bangladesh National Party (BNP) members silenced the op-
position.1 On the other hand, Bangladeshi voters apparently appreciated 
the government’s capacity to foster economic growth and guarantee secu-
rity. The allegations of voting irregularities were not enough to explain the 
Awami League’s impressive victory, whose real reasons should be carefully 
analysed.
Sheikh Hasina aims to appear a secular leader and the champion 
of Bangladesh’s development and democratization. However, her govern-
ment has used an iron fist against the opposition and adopted contro-
versial measures aimed at discouraging political dissent. Rather than a 
1.  ‘Bangladesh court orders arrest of Khalida Zia for arson attack’, Economic 
Times, 2 January 2018; ‘Khaleda Zia jailed for five years in corruption case’, Al Jazeera, 
8 February 2008; ‘Ex-Bangladesh PM Khaleda Zia Gets 7 Years In Jail In Corruption 
Case’, NDTV, 29 October 2018; ‘Khaleda Zia sentenced to 7 years in another graft 
case’, Economic Times, 29 October 2018.
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democracy, Bangladesh under the Awami League’s rule appears to be a 
«hybrid regime», namely a state which, in spite of the existence of dem-
ocratic structures such as elections, is fundamentally authoritarian. How-
ever, it is worth stressing that this kind of political system is increasingly 
catching on in Asia as the ideal formula to ensure political stability and 
economic development.2 
Bangladesh’s economic growth is considered, indeed, as the effect of 
political stability and the main factor of the government’s broad consensus. 
As far as foreign policy is concerned, Bangladesh continued to carry 
out a regional policy in balance between its two powerful neighbours, India 
and China. 
The Rohingya crisis, sparked in 2017,3 received much less atten-
tion from domestic and international media, but, although alleviated in 
2018, still persisted. Whereas the refugees’ influx diminished, an estimat-
ed 693,000 Rohingya were still in Bangladesh in April 20184 and only a 
few of them accepted the proposal of a safe return to Myanmar at the end 
of the year.5 
2. The government’s iron fist against the BNP
In 2018 the BNP faced the worst leadership crisis in its history. On 
2 January 2018 the court ordered Khaleda Zia’s arrest as the instigator of 
the bomb attack on a bus that killed eight people during anti-government 
protests in Comilla in 2015.6 
Just the day before, the prosecutors demanded the death sentence for 
Zia’s son and BNP leader Tarique Rahman,7 who lives in exile in London, 
and for four other people for their alleged involvement in cases of murder 
and bomb attacks. Rahman is also accused of masterminding an attack in 
2.  ‘Democracy decaying in Bangladesh’, East Asia Forum, 6 March 2018. See 
also Nisha Sharmeen Ali, ‘Bangladesh: Democracy Stumbles’, The Diplomat, 6 De-
cember 2013.
3.  On the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh, Marzia Casolari, ‘Bangladesh 2017: 
The Rohingya’s carnage’, Asia Maior 2017, pp. 245-266.
4.  ‘Rohingya crisis’ (https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/bangladesh_100945.
html).
5.  Anna Ellis-Petersen, Shaikh Azizur Rahman, Michael Safi, ‘Bangladesh ad-
mits no Rohingya willing to take repatriation offer’, The Guardian, 15 November 2018.
6.  ‘Bangladesh court orders arrest of Khalida Zia for arson attack’, The Economic 
Times, 2 January 2018. Regarding the BNP involvement in 2015 riots and the bus at-
tacks, see Marzia Casolari, ‘Bangladesh 2015: The Emergence of Radical Islam’, Asia 
Maior 2015, pp. 313 and 315-316. 
7.  The party named Tarique Rahman its acting chairman the day after Khale-
da Zia’s arrest: ‘Bangladesh opposition names Zia’s son acting head’, Daily Mail, 9 
February 2018.
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2004, when ten grenades were thrown on a peaceful rally organised by the 
Awami League, then in opposition.8 
Khaleda Zia is facing several charges in different courts for stirring up 
the protracted violent protests of 2015, where 125 people were killed, and 
for publicly expressing doubts regarding the casualty figures of the 1971 
Liberation War against Pakistan. 
The former prime minister and her son were also facing several 
charges of graft.9 On 8 February 2018 Khaleda Zia was sentenced to five 
years imprisonment charged with embezzling about Tk 21 million (approx-
imately US$ 252,000). The sum came from foreign donations intended for 
a charity named after Ziaur Rahman, Bangladesh’s former president and 
Khaleda’s husband, and it was supposed to be employed to finance an or-
phanage. The crime was committed under Khaleda Zia’s tenure as prime 
minister, between 2001 and 2006.10 
This sentence was considered politically motivated, aimed at prevent-
ing Khaled Zia from challenging Sheikh Hasina in the elections and at silenc-
ing the BNP.11 However the case was filed by the Anti-Corruption Commis-
sion (ACC) in 2008, when the nonelected nonpartisan caretaker government 
- whose members neither represented any political party, nor were allowed to 
contest the elections – was in power, tasked with preparing that year’s elec-
tions. It is also worth noting that the case took ten years to close.12 
Apparently, the Zia Orphanage Trust case was just the tip of the ice-
berg, since the sum for which Khaleda and her son had been convicted was 
only a small part of the suspected wealth accumulated by Khaleda Zia’s el-
dest son, often from invisible income sources, during the two decades of his 
mother’s political engagement.13 
Corruption is a rampant problem in Bangladesh and the Zia Orphan-
age case was the occasion for the government to demonstrate to the country 
8.  Hasina barely escaped the attack, but sustained permanent partial hearing 
loss. ‘Bangladesh court orders arrest’; ‘Bangladesh prosecutors seek death for oppo-
sition leader’s son’, Gulf Times, 1 January 2018; ‘Bangladesh court hands life sentence 
to acting opposition party chief over 2004 blasts’, Reuters, 10 October 2018. In the 
attack 24 people lost their lives and about 300 were injured.
9.  ‘Khaleda Zia jailed’; ‘Ex-Bangladesh PM Khaleda Zia Gets 7 Years’, NDTV, 
29 October 2018; ‘Khaleda Zia sentenced to 7 years’; Marzia Casolari, ‘Bangladesh 
2014: Old Patterns, New Trends’, Asia Maior 2014, pp. 227.
10.  ‘Bangladesh Parliamentary Election December 2018’, GlobalSecurity.org, 
without date; ‘Khaleda Zia jailed’. 
11.  ‘Khaleda Zia jailed’; ‘Bangladesh opposition parties including BNP to 
contest election’, Reuters, 11 November 2018; Smruti S. Pattanaik, ‘Can Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP) Overcome the Leadership Crisis?’, Institute for Defence Studies 
and Analyses (IDSA), 15 February 2018; ‘The conviction of Khaleda Zia hobbles Bang-
ladesh’s opposition’, The Economist, 8 February 2018, online edition. 
12.  ‘BNP in crisis, not country: Quader’, The Daily Star, 9 February 2018; ‘On 
corruption and Punishment’, Daily Sun, 10 February 2018. 
13.  Ibid.
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that it was taking the problem seriously and putting in practice the principle 
«equal justice for all»,14 irrespective of political affiliation or social position. 
Of course, in doing this, the Sheikh Hasina-led government was also able 
to thwart the opposition. In fact, under Bangladesh’s Constitution anyone 
jailed for more than two years cannot contest an election for five years.15 
This conveniently excluded Khaleda Zia from the 2018 election. The BNP 
then considered boycotting the vote, as it did in 2014.16
After rejecting the decision of the lower court to free Khaleda Zia on 
bail for four months on 19 March 2018, in May the Supreme Court recon-
sidered this response, after Zia’s lawyers requested her release for health 
reasons.17 This decision was a wise compromise with the opposition, since 
it could open the door to the BNP’s participation in the elections.18 In fact, 
had the BNP boycotted the general election for the second time, its registra-
tion with the Election Commission would have been cancelled, preventing 
it from contesting any further parliamentary polls.19 The ruling party was 
concerned about another boycott, which could have taken the country back 
to the 2013 unrest and affected its stability, with great damage to Bangla-
desh’s economy.20 
14.  Ibid. Corruption is a devastating problem in Bangladesh and the govern-
ment passed several laws to address it, especially after 2004, when the ACC was es-
tablished. Public servants found to be guilty of corruption are punished under the 
Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1976, under Section 161 of the 
Penal Code, 1860 and under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA), 1947. Section 
5 of the PCA establishes that «if a public servant is found in possession of pecuniary 
resources or property in excess of his own or her declared sources of income and he 
or she fails to submit to the court a satisfactory explanation for the possession of such 
property, the person may be sentenced to a prison term extending up to seven years, 
and the property may be confiscated by the State». A list of relevant Bangladeshi 
Law on corruption is in ‘Business ethics and anticorruption laws: Bangladesh’ (www.
northonrosefulbright.com). Regarding anti-corruption laws and the role of ACC, see 
Marzia Casolari, ‘Bangladesh 2014’, pp. 226-227. What the Bangladeshi government 
did in 2018 was upholding existing laws. 
15.  ‘Khaleda Zia jailed for five years’; ‘Bangladesh prime minister denies’; Sm-
ruti S. Pattanaik, ‘Can Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) Overcome the Leadership 
Crisis?’.
16.  ‘Bangladesh ex-PM gets bail; party to consider poll boycott’, Reuters, 12 
March 2018.
17.  ‘Bangladesh Parliamentary Election’; Bangladesh court orders release of 
opposition leader Khaleda Zia’, The New Indian Express, 16 May 2018. 
18.  ‘Bangladesh ex-PM gets bail’.
19.  ‘Will BNP contest polls without Khaleda?’, Dhaka Tribune, 8 August 2018.
20.  ‘Bangladesh ex-PM gets bail’. Regarding 2014 riots and their consequenc-
es, see Marzia Casolari, ‘Bangladesh in fiamme: dallo scontro politico alla guerriglia 
urbana’, Asia Maior 2013, pp. 167-180. 
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3. The 2018 parliamentary elections
The 11th parliamentary elections were held as scheduled before the 
end of 2018 and took place on 30 December, in spite of Khaleda Zia’s 
objections and the BNP’s attempts to postpone the date.21 
The coalition led by the ruling Awami League obtained 96% of the 
vote and 288 of the 298 seats of Bangladesh’s one chamber parliament.22 
Voter turnout was 80%.23 
The date of the polls was announced only on 8 November. Initially 
it was scheduled for 23 December, but on 12 November it was postponed 
to 30 December.24 The opposition demanded to defer the polls by a month 
and wanted a caretaker government to administer the election process, but 
the government refused any postponement and rejected the request of a 
caretaker government as unconstitutional.25
21.  ‘Elections will not wait for anyone’, The Daily Star, 6 January 2018.
22.  ‘Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina set for landslide win as opposition demands 
new vote’, Dawn, 30 December 2018; ‘Bangladesh PM Hasina wins thumping victory 
in elections opposition reject as «farcical»’, The Guardian, 31 December 2018.
23.  ‘Bangladesh PM Hasina wins thumping victory’, ibid.
24.  ‘Polls now on December 30’, The Daily Star, 13 November 2018.
25.  ‘Bangladesh election campaign begins without an opposition candidate to 
challenge Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’, South China Morning Post, 10 December 2018; 
‘Bangladesh opposition parties including BNP’. The first caretaker government was 
introduced in Bangladesh to ensure free and fair parliamentary elections during the 
delicate transition from Hussain Muhammad Ershad’s authoritarian government to 
democracy in 1991. It was adopted as a permanent arrangement by the Thirteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution, under opposition pressure during the BNP govern-
ment. The caretaker government should be a non-political and non-partisan govern-
ment, but it is a difficult task in any country to find neutral people to take up such 
government responsibilities in sensitive moments for the nation. The Thirteenth 
Amendment identified the president in charge as responsible for the caretaker govern-
ment. This arrangement has at least two problems: the first is that a president is never 
a neutral person, but is the expression of a political party and has his own political per-
suasion; the second problem is that according to the Thirteenth Amendment 11 advis-
ers are responsible only to the president, while the latter has absolute control over the 
defence forces. These are the features of a presidential and not a parliamentary form 
of government. The Thirteenth Amendment conferred absolute powers on the pres-
ident. Considering that in 2007 the caretaker government was backed by the military 
and it took more than a year to finalise the electoral process, in Bangladesh there is a 
serious risk that, paradoxically, a caretaker government instead of being non-partisan, 
becomes dictatorial. It is therefore understandable why in 2011 the Awami League’s 
government introduced the Fifteenth Amendment, aimed at eliminating the Thir-
teenth Amendment and, accordingly, the caretaker government system. Regarding the 
caretaker government in Bangladesh, see Shahjahan Hafez Bhuiyan, ‘The Caretaker 
Government in Bangladesh: An Appraisal of its Formation’, Politics, Administration, and 
Change, No. 40, July-December 2003, pp. 33-51. About the elimination of the caretaker 
government, see Marzia Casolari, ‘Bangladesh. Crescita economica e mutamenti sociali 
in un paese «nuovo»: un bilancio’, Asia Maior 2011, pp. 234-235. 
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Before the election, the Awami League formed a coalition, the Grand 
Alliance, which included 14 parties with liberal democratic and leftist lean-
ings, some of them belonging to liberal political Islam26 and others with lib-
eral-democratic and republican leanings. A number of hard-core leftist par-
ties27 (including the Communist Party of Bangladesh), the Trinamool BNP,28 
founded in November 2018 by a group of BNP’s dissidents, and the Jatiya 
Party of former military dictator Hussain Muhammad Ershad joined this 
heterogeneous coalition as well.29 Paradoxically, the Jatiya Party joined the 
Awami League’s camp, although it was in opposition in the parliament.30 
The BNP participated in the election with a coalition of 20 parties.31 
It included the United National Alliance (UNA) and the Jatiya Oikya Prokri-
ya, or Jatiya Oikya Front (National Unity Front). Rather than proper parties, 
they were blocks of parties or conglomerate parties, formed by 58 and 20 
bodies respectively.32 
The Jamaat-e-Islami, the BNP’s historical ally, did not contest the 
elections, since its status as a political party was revoked in 2013.33 
From the ideological point of view, there was no meaningful differ-
ence between the two camps: the BNP-led coalition was certainly more 
26.  ‘Awami League to form new grand alliance’, Dhaka Tribune, 23 October 
2018. Some of the Islamic parties within the coalition are the Islamic Front Bang-
ladesh, the Zaker Party and the Sammilita Jote, that share the ideals of what can be 
defined as liberal political Islam and oppose the Jamaat e-Islami (JI) as the BNP’s 
main ally and for being responsible for the 1971 massacre. To know more about these 
parties, see ‘Islamist party prefers AL-led alliance over JaPa’, Dhaka Tribune, 4 May 
2017; Anwar A. Khan, ‘Sammilita Sangskritik Jote: A magnificent cultural organiza-
tion for Bangladesh’, The Asian Age, part 1-3, 24 and 31 July, 2 August 2018; further 
information can be found at the party’s website: http://zakerpartybd.com.
27.  They are Ganatantrik Andolan, the Ganatantrik Jote and the newly found-
ed Bam Ganatantrik Jote, the Jago Dal, the Ekamot Andolon, the Krishak Sramik 
Janata League: ‘Awami League to form’. Unfortunately, at present it is not possible 
to describe the features and reconstruct the history of Bangladesh’s political parties, 
due to lack of available sources and information. The existing literature focuses on 
political and electoral processes, rather than tracing the history of Bangladesh’s party 
system or describing their programmes. 
28.  ‘Nazmul Huda’s Trinamool BNP, eight other parties «joining» Awami 
League-led coalition’, bdnew24.com, 19 July 2018.
29.  ‘Awami League to form’.
30.  The Jatiya Party joined a coalition led by the Awami League also in the 
2008 election: ‘Mega alliance in the making’, The Daily Star, 14 November 2018. 
31.  ‘BNP-led 20-Party Alliance to participate in the election’, Dhaka Tribune, 11 
November 2018.
32.  ‘BNP confirms more of its candidates as it shares nominations for seats with 
allies’, bdnews24.com, 22 August 2018;’Politics may see new polarization’, The Daily 
Star, 21 October 2018; ‘Bangladesh opposition parties including BNP’.
33.  ‘Jamaat e-Islami stripped of right to contest Bangladesh elections’, bd-
news24.com, 29 October 2018; ‘Bangladeshi court bans Islamist party from elections’, 
The Guardian, 1 August 2013.
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conservative, since it included Islamic radical parties like the Jamaat-e-Is-
lami, the Khelafat Majlish and the Jamiyate Ulamaye Islam, that advo-
cated the Islamisation of the state. But the same coalition included also 
parties like the Krishak Sramik Janata League (Peasants’ and Workers’ 
People’s League), presided by Kader Siddique, who fought the Bangla-
desh Liberation War in 1971 as a militant of the Mukti Bahini, the guer-
rilla freedom fighters.34 
To give an example of the contradictions of the Bangladeshi po-
litical scene, the Jatiya Oikya Front was formed by four main parties: the 
Gono Forum (also spelled Gano Forum), which originated from a split of 
the Awami League;35 the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), with socialist ideals; 
the already-mentioned Krishak Sramik Janata League; the Nagorik Oikya, 
founded in 2012 by Mahmudur Rahman Manna, former organizer secre-
tary of the Awami League.36
The Jatiya Oikya Front and the Gono Forum were founded by Kamal 
Hossain (aged 82). One of the nation’s founding fathers and a member of 
the Bangladesh Constituent Assembly, he was considered the champion of 
secular democracy in Bangladesh.37 
The Khelafat Majlish, for instance, in 2006 allied with the Awami 
League38. Paradoxically, now these parties sit on opposite sides in the par-
liament. 
The political situation in Bangladesh has traditionally been contra-
dictory and fluctuating, with parties shifting very easily from one camp to 
the other. As already pointed out, most leaders of the main parties now 
allied with the BNP in the past have been linked to the Awami League. 
Titled «Bangladesh on march towards poverty», the 2018 electoral 
manifesto of the Awami League was based on the party’s declaration at the 
national conference in 2016; «building a developed and digital Bangladesh» 
was its vision. Development was indeed the key subject of the Awami League 
electoral campaign: building up the blue economy, developing information 
and technology, fostering youth education and fighting malnutrition were 
its key objectives. The party pledged to carry out mega infrastructural pro-
jects, develop energy and mineral sectors, and improve youth employment. 
Freedom from poverty, terrorism, political extremism and corruption were 
its long term goals. More concretely, the party promised to create jobs for 10 
million youths, to increase the GDP rate of growth from 7.8% to 10%, to bring 
the poverty rate from 22% to zero by 2041, to take measures to protect the 
34.  ‘Valour of three teenage freedom fighters’, The Daily Star, 26 March 2018. 
Kader Siddique was 15 when he fought in the Liberation War.
35.  ‘Two decades of Gono Forum’, Probenews, 4 February 2012.
36.  ‘Nagorik Oikya is now a political party’, The Daily Star, 2 June 2017.
37.  ‘In Bangladesh, a Secular Icon and the Centre-Right Opposition Join 
Hands’, The Wire, 14 October 2018. 
38.  ‘Hasina warns of plot against AL’, New Age, 24 June 2007.
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minorities and formulate a media friendly law, aimed at preventing the mis-
use of information and promoting a journalism «loyal to social liabilities».39 
The BNP’s electoral manifesto focused on politics, justice, development 
and social equality. Strengthening democracy, protecting freedom of speech 
and expression and ensuring the independence of the judiciary were the key 
issues, but there was no reference to the economy. The party promised to 
scrap what it defined «the black laws», like the Digital Security Act, the Special 
Powers Act and the Official Secrets Act. Unfortunately, the BNP had already 
made the promise to scrap the Special Powers Act in 2001 and, when it was in 
power, did not maintain its promise.40 The BNP pledged to stop extrajudicial 
killings, a practice that began under its government, in 2001-2006. It also 
promised freedom of speech, expression and information, although it was the 
BNP government which enacted the Information Technology Act in 2006, 
containing a clause that seriously compromised the freedom of information.41 
The pre-electoral period was very tense: since the announcement of 
the ballot, on 8 November and up to the election day, the official death 
toll was 21. Activists of both sides complained of attacks on supporters and 
candidates. Only in the capital the voting was largely peaceful, due to the 
massive deployment of security.42
Violence marred the election day, when at least 17 people were killed 
in clashes between the police, BNP’s and Awami League’s supporters, in spite 
of tight security measures and 600,000 troops deployed across the country.43 
When the results of the elections were declared, controversy broke out. 
The opposition accused the ruling party of vote rigging, reporting stuffed 
ballots and intimidations in 221 of 300 polling stations. The BNP branded 
the polls as «farcical» and urged the Election Commission to void the re-
sults. Khaleda Zia announced that the five elected BNP members would not 
take the oath.44 On the other side, though the polls were still not closed the 
opposition declared it would reject the results of the elections.45 
39.  ‘Awami League finalizes election manifesto’, Dhaka Tribune, 24 November 
2018; ‘AL vows to make media friendly law’, bssnews.net, 18 December 2018; ‘Election 
pledges: Awami League manifesto. View our mistakes with kindness’, The Daily Star, 
19 December 2018. 
40.  ‘Election pledges: BNP manifesto. No black laws, no revenge’, The Daily 
Star, 19 December 2018.
41.  Ibid. Section 57 of the Act provides for the punishment of a maximum jail 
term of 14 years for the deliberate publication and transmission in printed or elec-
tronic form of false or obscene material. But an authoritarian government can use a 
similar provision to limit the freedom of the press, as actually happened in Bangla-
desh, during both governments: ‘The trap of Section 57’, The Daily Star, 7 July 2017. 
42.  ‘Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina set for landslide win’.
43.  Ibid.; ‘Bangladesh PM Hasina wins thumping victory’.
44.  ‘Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to form new cabinet’, China 
Daily, 3 January 2019.
45.  ‘Bangladesh PM Hasina wins thumping victory’.
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In spite of the opposition’s claims, the Election Commission reported 
only a few allegations of irregularities.46 Hasina denied the allegations, de-
fining the election «totally free and independent» and rejected the call for a 
fresh vote, requested by the opposition.47 
The 71 year old Sheikh Hasina secured a record fourth term and 
third consecutive mandate, ushering in a new phase of stability. 
The elected members of parliament were sworn in on 3 January, while 
Prime Minister Hasina was expected to form the new cabinet by 10 January 
2019.48 
4. The reasons of the Awami League’s success and the BNP’s crisis 
Domestic and international media criticised the Awami League and 
Sheikh Hasina for being increasingly authoritarian and intolerant of dis-
sent, for cracking down on the opposition with objectionable means and 
for human rights abuse. They labelled Bangladesh as a «one party democ-
racy».49 The prosecution of Khaleda Zia and her son was considered as the 
main cause of the BNP’s crisis and defeat.50 
However, explaining the landslide election results in favour of the 
Awami League only as the result of vote-rigging, intimidation and repres-
sion would be simplistic. This is not to deny all these factors, but they alone 
are not enough to understand what was going on in Bangladesh. Similarly, 
explaining the BNP’s leadership crisis only on the basis of its chiefs’ troubles 
with the law is also simplistic. 
Defining Bangladesh as a «one party democracy» is inappropriate: Ban-
gladesh parliamentary politics are based on a multiparty system; the point is 
46.  ‘Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina set for landslide win’; ‘Bangladesh prime 
minister denies accusations of rigged vote’, The Washington Post, 31 December 2018; 
‘Bangladesh PM Hasina wins thumping victory’, ibid.
47.  ‘Bangladesh PM Hasina wins thumping victory’, ibid.
48.  ‘Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to form new cabinet’.
49.  ‘Why Bangladesh’s landslide election result is bad for its democracy’, The 
Washington Post, 31 December 2018.
50.  ‘Bangladesh ex-PM gets bail’, ibid; ‘Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina set for 
landslide win’; ‘Bangladesh PM Hasina wins thumping victory’; ‘Bangladesh Elec-
tions: Choice of «Lesser of Two Evils», Voters Say’, The New York Times, 29 December 
2018; ‘Bangladesh elections 2018: What you need to know’, Al Jazeera, 29 December 
2018; ‘Bangladesh Votes Today, Sheikh Hasina Seeks Fourth Term As Prime Minis-
ter’, NDTV, 30 December 2018; ‘Why Bangladesh’s landslide election result is bad’, 
ibid.; ‘Bangladesh elections: Sheikh Hasina’s party wins large majority amid accusa-
tions of vote-rigging’, The Independent, 31 December 2018; ‘A disputed election and a 
dangerous new era for Bangladesh’ politics’, CNN, 1 January 2019. A bitter comment 
came also from the British government, through the Foreign and Commonwealth 
minister Mark Field: ‘Minister for Asia statement on Bangladesh elections’, www.gov.
uk, 1 January 2019.
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rather how parties form alliances.51 The reasons of the Awami League’s suc-
cess and the BNP’s failure lie with their respective capacity to attract political 
allies. From the pre-election dynamic it was clear that the Awami League’s 
formula, almost entirely based on the country’s development and economic 
growth, was much more attractive than the BNP’s. The Awami League proved 
to be more capable to represent the interests of Bangladeshi economic sec-
tors. It is no coincidence, in fact, that three of Bangladesh’s biggest tycoons 
were connected to the Awami League. The first one, Syed Abul Hossain, has 
been a member of Bangladeshi parliament since 1991 and served as min-
ister of the State Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives 
between 2009 and 2012.52 Hossain is the founder of SAHCO International 
Ltd, a company that has worked since 1975 in infrastructural works, industrial 
and urban development, trading, construction, information technology and 
telecommunication, power, land and water management.53 
The second tycoon, Salman Fazlur Rahman, is vice chairman of the 
Beximco Group (Bangladesh Export Import Company Limited). Founded 
in 1970, Beximco is the largest conglomerate in Bangladesh and one of the 
largest textile producers in Asia, listed on the London Stock Exchange. The 
brand has investments across a wide range of other fields, including marine 
food, construction, information and communication technology, hotel man-
agement and trading.54 Rahman is also the president of the Association of 
Television Channel Owners (ATCO).55 From 2009 to the present, Rahman 
has been serving as the private sector development affairs adviser to Awami 
League President and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina; this in spite of previous 
charges of corruption and fraud, in 1996 and 2007, which put him in jail for 
one year between 2007 and 2008, when he was granted bail.56 
The third tycoon, Sajeeb Wazed, Harvard-educated son of Sheikh 
Hasina, is the president of the US-based Wazed Consulting Inc. and 
honorary, unpaid ICT prime minister’s adviser.57
51.  Rounaq Jahan, ‘Political Parties, Movements, Elections and Democracy in 
Bangladesh’, Gyantapas Abdur Razzaq Distinguished Lecture, 27 January 2018. 
52.  ‘Abul Hossain: Allegations against me were completely lies’, Dhaka Tribune, 
12 February 2017.
53.  See the official site of SAHCO International Ltd, at www.sahco.biz 
54.  ‘All to know about Salman F Rahman’, Corporate Bangladesh, 4 January 2018. 
See also Beximco’s official site: www.beximcoltd.com. Besides being listed among the 
world’s billionaires, Rahman is described also as a visionary and a philanthropist. 
55.  ‘Salman F Rahman new ATCO president’, The Independent, 22 May 2017.
56.  ‘All to know about Salman F Rahman’; ‘Salman F. Rahman remains Sheikh 
Hasina’s adviser’, bdnews24.com, 6 November 2016; ‘Salman Rahman freed on bail’, 
The Daily Star, 28 August 2008; ‘Bangladesh’s Other Banking Scam’, The New York 
Times, 11 April 2016.
57.  ‘Joy appointed as honorary ICT adviser to PM’, Prothom Alo, 20 November 
2014; ‘Joy reappointed as PM’s honorary ICT adviser’, Dhaka Tribune, 15 January 
2019. 
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The above are just examples of the strict connection between politics 
and business in Bangladesh. Over the years, patronage has replaced ideol-
ogy as a means of building consensus.58 Patron-client relations continue to 
be the «cornerstone»59 of politics and society in Bangladesh, but they do not 
represent a mechanism to «further the interests of the party in power» any-
more.60 Rather, the opposite is true. Today, to take power the parties must 
further the interests of economic players. In recent years, the Awami League 
has been able to do that better than its rivals.
Besides these factors, there are other reasons of the BNP’s crisis, 
intrinsic to the party’s story. Patronage is the main cause of the BNP’s 
crisis, although it is endemic amongst all parties. The BNP became eager 
to grab state power and resources, which it succeeded in doing by building 
up an extensive patron-client network. However this was a process that 
could not but increase corruption, in its extreme forms: criminalisation 
and political violence.61 
Tarique Rahman’s case is a typical example: he was prosecuted for 
political murder and is believed to be the most corrupt politician in Bangla-
desh, blamed also by his party fellows for being responsible for the BNP’s 
political disaster.62
58.  But not in the way described by David Lewis. See his, Bangladesh. Politics, 
Economy and Civil Society, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 90-108. 
59.  Ibid., p. 99.
60.  Ibid., p. 107.
61.  Rounaq Jahan, ‘Political Parties in Bangladesh’, CPD-CMI Working Paper, 8 
August 2014, pp. 2 and 59. CPD and CMI are Center for Policy Dialogue, Dhaka, and 
Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway, respectively.
62.  ‘Tarique Rahman’s unending hunger – he wants money from everyone’, 
Blitz, 21 December 2018. It is very complex to reconstruct the intricate system of 
corruption managed by the Zia family and its entourage. The period 2001-2006, 
when Khaleda Zia was in power, is considered the darkest period in Bangladesh’s 
history. Arafat Rahman Koko, Khaleda’s youngest son, was charged for laundering 
approximately US$ 2 million, including US$ 180,000 from Siemens, through US and 
Singapore bank accounts. Both brothers were arrested in 2007. Siemens admitted 
to having bribed also the minister of Telecommunications Aminul Haque, in charge 
between 2001 and 2006. Haque was sentenced in 2007 to 31 years of prison for 
supporting the Jama’tul Mujahideen Bangladesh, responsible for the elimination of 
political opponents: David Montero, ‘Bangladesh. Following the Siemens Bribery 
Trail’, pbs, 1 April 2009. Also the FBI investigated bribery and money laundering 
activities of Tarique Rahman and BNP’s vice-chairman Giasuddin Al Mamun, who 
received US$ 750,000 from Nirman Construction Ltd. and from the Chinese Harbin 
Engineering Company. Tarique Rahman was sentenced to seven years imprisonment 
and a fine of Tk 200 million in 2016. These are just the main corruption cases in-
volving the Rahman brothers, a number of other cases involved Khaleda Zia and 
several BNP politicians: ‘Corruption of Zia Family and Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
(BNP)’, Bangladesh Awami League, (http://www.albd.org/articles/news/31472/Corrup-
tion-of-Zia-Family-and-Bangladesh-Nationalist-Party-(BNP)), 6 February 2018. 
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According to the American Embassy in Dhaka 
His [Tarique Rahman’s] theft of millions of dollars in public money has 
undermined political stability in this moderate Muslim-majority nation 
and subverted U.S. attempt to foster a stable democratic government, a 
key objective ìn this strategically important region. [...] Embassy Dhaka 
has three key priorities for Bangladesh: democratisation, development, 
and denial of space for terrorists. Tarique’s audaciously corrupt 
activities jeopardize all three. [...] In short, much of what is wrong in 
Bangladesh can be blamed on Tarique and his cronies.63
On the basis of these considerations, the American Embassy suggested 
suspending Tarique Rahman’s visa for the United States.64 *
In the year under review, BNP appeared to be in the midst of the 
worst crisis in its history, second only to the one caused by Ziaur Rahman’s 
assassination (30 May 1981), with its charismatic leader, Khaleda Zia, in jail 
and many of its senior leaders facing criminal charges. The acting chair-
man, Tarique Rahman, from his London exile, could not easily lead the 
party, which was left drifting.65 
5. The economy
In 2017-2018 Bangladesh’s economy grew 7.86%, overcoming the 
provisional estimate of 7.65%. Industry grew 12.06%, the services 6.39% 
and agriculture 4.19%.66 In 2018 Bangladesh’s GDP surpassed Pakistan’s 
and is likely to surpass India’s by 2020.67 Since Bangladesh’s economy start-
63.  Telegram from the American Embassy in Dhaka to the Secretary of State, 
8 November 2018 (https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08DHAKA1143_a.html). The 
document contains an extensive and very detailed description of the crimes com-
mitted by Tarique Rahman, the multi-million «ill-gotten» wealth he accumulated, 
his habit of frequently demanding bribes from businessmen in connection with gov-
ernment procurements, his «systematic pattern of extortion», also involving foreign 
firms, and the manipulation of judicial process. 
64.  Ibid.
65.  Smruti S. Pattanaik, ‘Can Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) Overcome 
the Leadership Crisis?’.
66.  ‘GDP growth reaches 7.86pc in final count’, The Daily Star, 19 September 
2018.
67.  World Economic Forum, This is what you need to know about Bangladesh’s re-
markable economic rise, April 2018; ‘At current rates, Bangladesh could top India’s per 
capita income by 2020’, Business Standard, 28 May 2018; ‘Bangladesh may surpass In-
dia in three years’, The Financial Express, 30 May 2018; ‘Why is Bangladesh’s economy 
booming?’, livemint, 25 April 2018.
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ed to rise in 2006, its GDP growth has exceeded Pakistan’s of about 2.5% 
per year, while Bangladesh’s population growth is 1.1% per year, compared 
to Pakistan’s 2.5%.68
Bangladesh’s poverty rate stands at 21.8% and extreme poverty at 
11.3%, against 23.1% and 12.1% respectively, in 2017; the government is 
expecting to bring it to zero by 2030. Per capita income in 2018 was US$ 
1,751.69 
Today Bangladesh’s economy is among the fastest growing econo-
mies in the developing world, underpinned by strong domestic demand 
and structural transformation, aiming to create more and better jobs, boost 
private investment, diversify exports, build human capital, and create a 
business-friendly environment.70
In spite of the recovery in garment exports and remittances, the defi-
cit has increased because of the rise in imports. Account and fiscal deficits 
are expected to increase, although the risks of external and public debt dis-
tress are low. Inflation is expected to accelerate due to the increase of global 
commodity prices.71
Commenting on the election results, most media connected Hasina’s 
victory to the country’s impressive economic growth, relating it to political 
stability, which they described as fruit of authoritarian and repressive meth-
ods.72 Bangladesh’s economic rise is therefore generally considered as the 
most meaningful result of an authoritarian and stable political system.
However, a more likely cause of Bangladesh’s remarkable economic 
growth appears to be the progressive social policies carried out in recent 
years, namely education, of girls in particular, healthcare and female em-
powerment.73 
At the moment of writing, Bangladesh’s integration in the global 
financial chain and supply markets is still limited; therefore the country 
does not appear to be totally immune from the effects of possible disruptive 
events, like negative financial market trends, increased trade protectionism, 
escalating geopolitical tensions, volatility in oil prices. These factors can 
have negative effects on global economic growth and, consequently, on Ban-
gladesh’s export prospects.74 
68.  ‘This is what you need to know’; ‘Why is Bangladesh’s economy booming?’.
69.  ‘GDP growth reaches 7.86pc’.
70.  The World Bank, Bangladesh Development Update. Powering the economy effi-
ciently, 1 October 2018, p. VII. 
71.  Ibid., pp. VII and IX.
72.  ‘Bangladesh election: Sheikh Hasina heads for tainted victory’, The Guard-
ian, 27 December 2018; ‘Bangladesh election: PM Sheikh Hasina wins landslide in 
disputed vote’, BBC News, 31 December 2018; ‘Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina set for 
landslide win’; ‘Bangladesh PM Hasina wins thumping victory’; ‘Bangladesh prime 
minister denies accusations’.
73.  ‘This is what you need to know’; ‘Why is Bangladesh’s economy booming?’.
74.  The World Bank, Bangladesh Development Update, pp. 22-23. 
Marzia Casolari
260
In order to reduce possible downward risks, the top policy priorities 
remain creating more and better jobs by enhancing private investment, 
building human capital, diversifying exports, improving financial and 
economic governance and enhancing infrastructural investment, especially 
in electricity supply, since energy efficiency is an essential condition for 
industrial growth.75 
6. Foreign policy
As noted by the analyst Ishrat Hossain of the University of Oxford: 
«As the strategic rivalry between India and China intensifies, Bangladesh 
increasingly finds itself embroiled in a great game along the Indian Ocean».76 
The escalation of India-China rivalry in the region has made Bangladesh a 
key battleground and has shaped Narendra Modi’s foreign policy initiatives, 
like «Act East» and «Neighbourhood First».77 Although the former is being 
labelled as the «old Look East wine put in a new bottle»,78 it contains some 
innovations, introduced by the «Modi Doctrine». 
The ambitious projects of the Indian prime minister aim to integrate 
South Asia with both Western Asia and Eastern Africa.79 As the whole of 
South Asia is included in this frame, Bangladesh plays a key role in this 
geopolitical design. 
The «Neighbourhood First» policy gives topmost priority to India’s 
relations with neighbouring countries. India is aware that if it does not 
improve its relations with its neighbours, it will pave the way to China’s 
growing influence in the region.80 
Bangladesh’s relations with India warmed up when Sheikh Hasina 
came to power in 2009 and intensified after Narendra Modi’s rise in 2014.81 
Narendra Modi warmly welcomed Sheikh Hasina’s electoral victory.82 In his 
75.  Ibid., pp. VII, IX, 26-33.
76.  Ishrat Hossain, ‘Bangladesh balances between big brothers China and In-
dia’, East Asia Forum, 6 June 2018. 
77.  Ibid.
78.  Ibid.
79.  Sudhanshu Tripathi, ‘Why India is switching from a Look East to an Act 
East policy’, Asia Times, 15 June 2017.
80.  Vinay Kaura, ‘Grading India’s Neighbourhood Diplomacy’, The Diplomat, 
1 January 2018. 
81.  For an overview of Bangladesh-India relations in Modi’s era, see Marzia 
Casolari, ‘Bangladesh 2014’, pp. 230-233; Marzia Casolari, ‘Bangladesh 2015’, pp. 
336-338; Marzia Casolari, ‘Bangladesh 2016’, pp. 293-295; Marzia Casolari, ‘Bang-
ladesh 2017’, pp. 261-262.
82.  ‘PM Modi congratulates Sheikh Hasina on landslide victory in Bangladesh 
elections’, India Today, 31 December 2018; ‘Delhi congratulates Dhaka for «successful 
elections»’, Dhaka Tribune, 31 December 2018.
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message to the Bangladeshi prime minister, Modi reiterated the importance 
India attaches to Bangladesh as a close partner for regional cooperation 
and as the central pillar of India’s «Neighbourhood First» policy. However, 
in spite of bilateral cordial relations, the agreement on the sharing of the 
Teesta River waters is yet to be signed.83
In April 2018 the Bangladeshi prime minister visited India: the 
Indian government used this occasion to announce a new credit line of US$ 
4.5 billion for Bangladesh and US$ 500 million for Bangladesh’s purchase 
of Indian defence hardware.84 
Bangladesh plays a key role in India’s counterterrorism strategy.85 The 
first joint training exercise at the transnational level under BIMSTEC-Milex 
2018 took place in Pune (10-16 September 2018), with the participation 
of troops of all member states, except Nepal and Thailand, which sent 
observers.86 
Bangladesh is also the gateway for India’s regional initiatives, namely 
the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative 
for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).87 At the 
4th BIMSTEC summit, held in Kathmandu on 30 and 31 August 2018, a MoU 
was signed on the establishment of the BIMSTEC Grid Interconnection to 
enhance energy cooperation among the seven member states.88 
From being the keystone of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 
South Asia, recently Bangladesh has become the second largest importer of 
Chinese arms after Pakistan.89 A huge contract for the supply of 23 Hogdu 
K-8W training aircraft to the Bangladesh Air Force was signed in Dhaka on 
20 June. The amount of the deal was more than US$ 200 million.90 
As far as the BRI is concerned, of the three planned mega projects, only 
the Payra coal power plant is under construction, while the Dhaka-Jessore 
railway and the Karnaphuli underwater tunnel are in the project phase.91
Bangladesh’s foreign policy has been evolving: its engagement goes 
beyond relations with the traditional partners (India, China, Japan, UK, 
83.  Vinay Kaura, ‘Grading India’s Neighborhood Diplomacy’; Marzia Casolari, 
Bangladesh 2017, pp. 261-262. 
84.  Vinay Kaura, ‘Grading India’s Neighbourhood Diplomacy’.
85.  Ibid.
86.  ‘MILEX-18: First military exercise of BIMSTEC countries held in Pune’, 
GKToday, 11 September 2018; ‘Bimstec Milex 2018: Camaraderie, counter-terror-
ism operations on strong footing’, Hindustan Times, 19 September 2018. The BIM-
STEC countries include Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal 
and Bhutan.
87.  Ibid.
88.  ‘4th BIMSTEC Summit concludes’, Economic Times, 31 August 2018; Nazia 
Hussain, ‘Can BIMSTEC Finally Become Relevant?’, The Diplomat, 2 November 2018.
89.  Ishrat Hossain, ‘Bangladesh balances between big brothers’.
90.  ‘Bangladesh New Military Deal With China’, The Diplomat, 27 June 2018.
91.  Ishrat Hossain, ‘Bangladesh balances between big brothers’.
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US and Russia) and beyond its participation in the regional integration 
through SAARC, BIMSTEC, BBI, SASEC (South Asia Subregional Economic 
Cooperation) and BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor). 
Recently Bangladesh has been looking at the European Union to increase 
economic ties, develop cooperation for democratisation programmes and 
enhance partnerships in areas of environment protection.92
Multilateralism within the UN system has remained the pillar of 
Bangladesh’s foreign policy.93
7. The aftermaths of the Rohingya crisis 
Considering the tremendous impact of the Rohingya crisis on 
Bangladesh in 2017,94 the aftermath of the crisis in 2018 cannot be 
glossed over. At the end of May 2018 the UN struck a deal with Myanmar, 
allowing hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to 
return to Myanmar safely and by choice. Conditional for the finalisation 
of the agreement had been the acceptance by Myanmar of the concession 
of citizenship and human rights for the refugees returning to Myanmar. 
However, the deal did not guarantee freedom of movement outside the 
Rakhine state. Refugees’ representatives and human rights organisations 
argued that the agreement still failed to ensure basic rights for the 
Rohingya.95 
In October the UN overturned its decision, with the discovery that 
the genocide against the Rohingya was still ongoing in Myanmar, although 
Bangladesh and Myanmar had already agreed to start the repatriation 
process.96 
Fortunately, the Bangladeshi government was totally committed to the 
principle of non-refoulement97 and pledged to adhere to the principle of 
92.  ‘FM outlines new priorities in Bangladesh foreign policy to face changing 
world’, bdnews24.com, 10 January 2018.
93.  Ibid. 
94.  Marzia Casolari, ‘Bangladesh 2017’, pp. 246-258. 
95.  Poppy McPerson & Zeba Siddiqui, ‘Secret U.N.-Myanmar deal on Rohingya 
offers no guarantees on citizenship’, Reuters, 29 March 2018.
96.  Anna Ellis-Petersen & Shaikh Azizur Rahman, ‘Rohingyas to be repatriated 
despite UN genocide warning’, The Guardian, 30 October 2018.
97.  The principle of non-refoulement prohibits States from transferring or 
removing individuals from their jurisdiction or effective control when there are sub-
stantial grounds for believing that the person would be at risk of irreparable harm 
upon return, including persecution, torture, ill-treatment or other serious human 
rights violations. United Nations, Human Rights, Office of the high commission-
er, The principle of non-refoulement under international human rights law, without date 
(https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/GlobalCompactMigration/The-
PrincipleNon-RefoulementUnderInternationalHumanRightsLaw.pdf).
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voluntary repatriation only. The result was that, in spite of the preparations 
by the Bangladeshi authorities for a safe return, no Rohingya refugee 
accepted to go back to Myanmar.98
98.  Anna Ellis-Petersen & Shaikh Azizur Rahman,‘Rohingyas to be repatriated 
despite UN genocide warning’.

